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ABSTRACT 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is generally described as the most 
effective human rights protection mechanism. While the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to 
civil and political rights, the protection of socio-economic rights at the Council of Europe is 
sought primarily through the Collective Complaint Procedure (CCP). Such a distinction 
reflects the traditional perception of human rights, according to which the protection of 
socio-economic rights has been regarded as inferior to first-category human rights. However, 
analysis of the ECtHR and CCP from the viewpoint of emergency medical service illustrates 
that, contrary to the prevailing understanding, both mechanisms do provide equally effective 
protection for claims concerning the right to emergency health care. 
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Human rights are the rights designed to safeguard the needs and purposes of 
human beings.1 Traditionally civil and political rights, such as the right to life and 
prohibition of torture, have been distinguished from socio-economic rights because 
of the fact that the realization of the second-category rights has generally been 
regarded as demanding more contributions from the states, which is why civil and 
political rights are perceived superior to economic and social rights. 2  Such a 
conventional understanding of human rights is generally uphold by codifying these 
two sets of rights into two separate legal documents, like the Council of Europe 
(CoE) has done.  
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),3 and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) related to it, is described as the most effective one from all 
existing human rights treaties worldwide. The success of the ECtHR relies heavily 
on the comprehensive case law it has created throughout the years. Nevertheless, 
not underestimating the achievements of the ECtHR, the jurisdiction of the Court is 
limited to examining simple the cases of alleged violations of civil and political 
rights covered by the ECHR and its protocols.4 Socio-economic rights, on the other 
hand, are protected by the European Social Charter (the Charter). 5  The 
enforcement of these rights has been constructed upon the state reporting system 
and Collective Complaint Procedure (CCP).  
However, the distinction between two human rights categories seems rather 
ambiguous in daily life. For example, in core human rights treaties the rights to 
health and health care are categorized as socio-economic rights,6 despite the fact 
that they de facto put great emphasis on civil and political rights as well. This 
emphasis is particularly obvious in relation to emergency medical service (EMS) 
which, for instance, under Finnish law is defined as “urgent treatment of the 
patients who have suffered an injury or a sudden onset of an illness outside the 
                                         
1 Tanel Kerikmäe and Katrin Nyman-Metcalf, “Less is More or More is More? Revisiting Universality of 
Human Rights,” International and Comparative Law Review 12 (2012): 44; Tanel Kerikmäe, Ondrej 
Hamulak, and Archil Chochia, “A Historical Study of Contemporary Human Rights: Deviation or 
Extinction?” Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum 4 (2016): 99. 
2 Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Practice and Morals 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 263; Klaus Fusch, “The European Social Charter: Its Role in 
Present-Day Europe and its Reforms”: 151; in: Krzysztof Drzwicki, Catarina Krause, Alan Rosas, eds., 
Social Rights as Human Rights: A European Challenge (Turku: Åbo Akademi University Institute for 
Human Rights, 1994). 
3 Officially named as Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950, 
CETS No. 005). 
4 The ECHR, art. 32. 
5 European Social Charter, originally adopted in 1961 (CETS No. 035) and revised in 1996 (CETS No. 
163). 
6 For example, the revised European Social Charter (1996), art. 11 and 13; the International Covenant 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), art. 12. 
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health care treatment facilities, and transportation of the patient to the treatment 
unit with the most appropriate medical service.”7 Therefore, responding to the most 
urgent and severe threats to health, the EMS system has essentially been created 
to safeguard the inherent human right to life, hence potentially challenging the 
conventional understanding of human rights categories. 
It should be noted that discussion on health care related human rights as 
such is not unprecedented; quite to the contrary. Scholarly views have been 
presented inter alia on the right to health and health care in general, or on specific 
health questions, such as maternal care or protection against infectious diseases.8 
However, no separate or comprehensive legal focus on EMS has been given. For 
example, the United Nation’s commentary on the right to health, which is generally 
considered as the most valued document in this context, describes the very 
minimum level of health care that is expected from states, including for example 
nutrition, vaccinations and attainable health services, but even such a commentary 
fails to recognize the role of EMS in relation to most urgent health care.9 Thus, EMS 
is important from a human rights perspective not only because of its close 
connection to the right to life as the first step of the medical care in the most 
urgent situations and possible fatal consequences of the failure to guarantee the 
service, but also – and precisely – because EMS has so long been overlooked as 
being a human right. 
This article evaluates how the right to EMS can be claimed and enforced under 
the human rights protection mechanisms of the CoE (namely ECtHR and CCP) and 
what the potential faults of those mechanisms in this regard are. The analysis 
focuses on two types of claim which, for the purpose of the article, are identified as 
general and individual. A general claim is one in which the violation is alleged to 
exist because of the ineffectiveness (i.e. faults) of the prevailing system but no 
actual incident has occurred to an individual yet. An individual claim, conversely, 
derives from the violation of the rights of one or more individuals. Essentially, the 
article argues that, contrary to the prevailing understanding, both enforcement 
mechanisms do provide equally effective protection for health care related claims. 
In this context effectiveness is evaluated primarily by comparing these two 
enforcement mechanisms in order to determine which one would offer better 
                                         
7 Health Care Act (Terveydenhuoltolaki, 1326/2011), art. 40(1). 
8 See, for example, Colin Mc Innes and Kelly Lee, “Health, Security and Foreign Policy”, Review of 
International Studies 32 (2006); Brigit Toebes, “The Right to Health”; in: Alan Rosas, Catarina Krause, 
and Asbjorn Eide, eds., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: a Textbook (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2001); Jonas Juskevicius and Janina Balsienė, “Human Rights in Health Care: Some Remarks on the 
Limits of the Right to Health Care,” Jurisprudentia 4 (2010); Alicia Ely Yamin, “Toward Transformative 
Accountability: Applying a Rights-based Approach to Fulfill Maternal Health Obligations,” International 
Journal on Human Rights 7 (2010). 
9 United Nation’s Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “General Comment no. 
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)” (2000, E/C.12/2000/4). 
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grounds for successful claim concerning EMS. The leading (and rather optimistic) 
assumption is that states are willing to comply with and draw inspirations from 
decisions of these human rights monitoring bodies. When cases concerning EMS 
have not been discussed or challenged, states are more prone to perceive EMS as a 
political or economic question rather than a human right.10 However, when EMS is 
acknowledged to belong among protected human rights, more consideration to this 
right will be given at the national level because the question of functioning EMS 
system is no longer merely an internal political or economic matter but has an 
international importance on how other states perceive one’s human rights situation, 
and can therefore also affect international relations. Effectiveness in relation to EMS 
system, on the other hand, refers to all aspects which, if not working properly, 
could compromise EMS and result actual or foreseeable loss of lives. 
The article consists of five parts. Following the introduction, the second part of 
the article analyses the right to EMS from the perspective of the Charter and the 
CCP as its protection mechanism. The third part introduces the relevant ECHR 
articles and the ECtHR case law which could be applied in submitting the claim 
concerning the right to EMS to the Court. Part four compares the protection 
mechanisms of the Charter and the ECHR and evaluates their effectiveness in 
relation to the right to EMS. Finally, the fifth part summarizes and concludes the 
article.     
1. THE RIGHT TO EMS CAN BE DETECTED FROM THE EUROPEAN 
SOCIAL CHARTER 
1.1 THE NATURE AND THE SCOPE OF THE CHARTER INCLUDES EMS 
The original Charter was established in 1961.11 However, acknowledging the 
developments of economic and social rights, including increased equality between 
men and women over the years, the Charter was revised in 1996 to provide a 
better protection on socio-economic needs for the population of the CoE member 
states.12 In fact, the Charter represents the genuine nature of the socio-economic 
                                         
10 For example, a parliamentary ombudsman of Finland issued a decision in 2015 according to which the 
equal access to EMS was compromised in Finland due to the dead zones in Emergency Medical Service 
Helicopters’ (HEMS) operational areas. Despite the constitutional references in the decision the Ministry 
of Social Welfare and Health was in spring 2018 still in an opinion that the question of new HEMS basis is 
merely a political and economic question. Decision of Parliamentary Ombudsman (2015, Dnro 
1989/4/14); Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö, Työryhmä Selvittää Lääkärihelikopterien Uusien Tukikohtien 
Sijoituspaikkakunnat (2018, Briefing 58/2018) (Ministry of Social Welfare and Health, Working Group 
Established to Determine the Geographical Bases for New HEMSs). 
11 European Social Charter (1961, CETS No 035). 
12 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the revised European Social Charter (Strasburg, 1996), 7. 
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human rights by providing the goals to be achieved by the states rather than strict 
measures on how to comply with the rights set out in the text.13  
Contrary to conventional treaties, the Charter has a unique layout providing a 
general statement of rights and principles in Part I, which summarizes the articles 
of the Charter and appear as declaratory political aims for the states.14 Legally 
binding articles are introduced in Part II. However, to offer the states some 
autonomy by not imposing too heavy a burden on them, and thereby tempting 
more states to adopt the Charter, part III allows the participants of the Charter to 
choose the articles to which they consider themselves bound. The selection cannot 
be haphazard, but needs to be done according to the common principles.15 
The protection of health and health care is codified primarily in articles 11 and 
13. Article 11 obliges the states to ensure the effective exercise of the right to 
protection of health by undertaking appropriate measures. More specifically, the 
obligation refers to the removal of causes of ill-health (art. 11(1)), offering advisory 
and educational facilities for the promotion of health (art. 11(2)) and the prevention 
of epidemic, endemic and other diseases as well as accidents (art. 11(3)). 
According to the general obligation set forth in the article, the measures to protect 
health can be taken either directly by the state or in cooperation with the public or 
private organizations.  
Article 13 is dedicated to the right to social and medical assistance. The first 
paragraph (art. 13(1)) requires the states to ensure a person to be granted 
adequate assistance when that person is without adequate resources and is unable 
to secure such resources. The social security scheme and cases of sickness are 
particularly mentioned in article. Article 13(2) appears, for its part, to strengthen 
the general non-discrimination clause of the Charter by obliging the state to ensure 
that the political and social rights of the person receiving the assistance described 
in article 13(1) shall not be diminished. 16  The right to receive personal help 
required to prevent, remove or alleviate personal or family want is secured in 
article 13(3). 
Although the Charter imposes great demand on the states’ economic 
resources,17 the circumspect wording of articles 11 and 13 reflects the nature of the 
socio-economic human rights being subjected to the progressive realization and 
                                         
13 European Social Charter (revised) (1996, CETS No 163), Preamble. 
14 Explanatory Report to the revised Charter, supra note 12, 12, 121. 
15 European Social Charter (revised), Part III, art. A(1)(b) requires the states be bound by at least six of 
the following articles of Part II of the Charter: 1, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 16,19, 20; Art. A(1)(b) requires the 
state to be bound by additional number of articles or numbered paragraphs of Part II of the Charter, the 
total number of articles being sixteen or total number of paragraphs being sixty-three. 
16 European Social Charter (revised), Part V, Article E. 
17 David Harris, “The Council of Europe (II): the European Social Charter”: 313; in: Raija Hanski and 
Markku Suksi, eds., An Introduction to the International protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (Turku: 
Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Academy, 2000). 
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thereby provides the states wide autonomy to choose the proper methods to meet 
their obligations. 18  For example, to ensure the availability of the appropriate 
personal help required under article 13(3), EMS can be provided by state-operated 
units or by private EMS entrepreneurs. Simultaneously, states define the specific 
details such as the locations of EMS units or professional qualifications required 
from ambulance crew. Although the Charter provisions seem more of guidelines, 
certain common standards can be found nevertheless. For example, compliance 
with article 11(1) requires the state to provide evidence that a satisfactory and 
generally accessible adequate medical and health infrastructure exists and proper 
medical care for the whole community without unnecessary delays or unbearable 
costs for the patients is provided.19 Article 13(3), on the other hand, has been 
perceived to refer mainly to social welfare schemes,20 despite the notion of ‘medical 
assistance’ being equally applicable to health care and EMS as well. Therefore, the 
broad and ambiguous wording of articles 11 and 13 allows various health related 
issues to fall within the scope of the Charter. 
1.2. APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO EMS IN THE 
CHARTER IS DONE PRIMARILY THROUGH COLLECTIVE COMPLAINT 
PROCEDURE 
Although the Charter is also enforced through the state reporting system,21 
more intriguing case law emerges from the collective complaint procedure (CCP). 
Contrary to the somewhat subjective reports which states themselves submit 
concerning the application of the Charter provisions to which they considered 
themselves bound, collective complaints are launched by the particular applicants 
claiming state’s non-compliance with the Charter provision in regard to a specific 
situation.  
The European Committee of Social Rights (the Committee), which prior to 
1998 was called the Committee of Independent Experts, is the main body 
interpreting the Charter in relation to the collective complaints.22 As the Protocol on 
collective complaints came into force in 1998, the Committee has drawn up 
                                         
18 Oliver De Shutter, “The European Social Charter”: 477; in: Catarina Krause and Martin Scheinin, eds., 
International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (Turku: Åbo Academy University Institute for 
Human Rights, 2012). 
19 European Committee of Social Rights, European Social Charter (revised): Conclusions 2009 –volume 
1, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publications, 2010), 26-29; Donna Gouien, David Harris, amd Leo 
Zwaak, Law and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights and European Social Charter 
(Strasbourg: Council of European Publishing, 1996), 397-398. 
20 Council of Europe, Social Protection in the European Social Charter: Social Charter monographs – No 
7, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publications, 2000), 102-104. 
21 European Social Charter (revised), Part VI, art. 21. 
22 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints 
(1995, CETS No. 158), art. 7-8 [hereafter referred to as “CCP Protocol”]. 
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numerous reports which it has then submitted to the Committee of the Ministers to 
be adopted as resolutions.23 Considering the extensive scope of the socio-economic 
rights covered by the Charter, it seems unsurprising that the cases submitted to 
the Committee vary from work-related matters to social security issues and to 
situations concerning environmental health.24 
The Committee has also evaluated a rather limited number of cases in relation 
to health care under articles 11(1) and 13(3) of the Charter especially, recognizing 
health care as a prerequisite for the preservation of human dignity.25 In addition to 
couple of cases concerning abortion practices,26 the most cases regarding articles 
11(1) and 13(3) have been lodged to protect the rights of illegal immigrants, 
asylum seekers or certain minority groups. For example, FIDH v. France concerned 
the illegal immigrants’ right to health care under article 13(3).27 Simultaneously, 
the applicants in DCI v. Belgium claimed that Belgium violated the right of the 
foreign minors unlawfully within the territory or seeking asylum to health care inter 
alia under articles 11(1) and 13(3).28 Medecins du Monde – International v. France, 
on the other hand, dealt with the right to protection of health and the right to 
medical assistance for Roma people migrating from Romania and Bulgaria.29  
Closely related to the EMS, the Committee has stated that all foreign nationals 
have the right at any time to obtain treatment for emergencies and life-threatening 
conditions.30  Such an acknowledgement is in fact well implemented in national 
laws.31 However, no case directly claiming state’s incompatibility with the Charter 
to guarantee the right to EMS per se has been filed or decided, although the 
Charter provides various opportunities to construct such a claim. For example, 
removal of ambulances from sparsely populated areas or a reduction in the number 
of ambulances in densely populated regions can amount to violation of article 
11(1). Large coverage areas and simultaneous missions result in long time intervals 
from dispatch to scene which can rapidly become fatal in the case of cardiac arrest 
if medical resuscitation is not started within a sufficient time frame. 32  In such 
                                         
23 Ibid, art. 9; Oliver De Shutter, supra note 18, 471. 
24 European Council of Police Trade Unions (CESP) v. France, European Committee of Social Rights 
(2002, complaint no 68/2001); Union Syndicale des Magistrats Administratifs (USMA) v. France (2013, 
complaint no 84/2012); Finnish Society of Social Rights v. Finland (2014, complaint no 88/2012); 
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (IFHR) v. Ireland (2008, complaint no 42/2007); 
MFHR v. Greece (2006, complaint no 30/2005); FIDH v. Greece (2013, complaint no 72/2011). 
25 FIDH v. France (2004, complaint no 14/2003). 
26 Federation of Catholic Families in Europe (FAFCE) v. Sweden (2015, complaint no 99/2013). 
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy (2015, complaint no. 91/2013). 
27 FIDH v. France, supra note 25. 
28 Defence for Children International (DCI) v. Belgium (2012, complaint no 69/2011). 
29 Medecins du Monde – International v. France (2012, complaint no 67/2011). 
30 FIDH v. France, supra note 25, 25. 
31  See, for example, Terveydenhuoltolaki (1326/2010, Health Care Act [of Finland]), art. 50; 
Tervishoiuteenuste korraldamise seadus (RT I 2001, 50, 284, Health Service Organisation Act [of 
Estonia]), art. 6. 
32 G. D. Perkins et al., “European Resuscitation Council Guidelines for Resuscitation 2015: Adult Basic 
Life Support and Automated External Defibrillation,” Resucitation 95 (2015): 83. 
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situations, the state is failing its obligation to take appropriate measures to remove 
the causes of ill-health as far as possible as, by reducing the number of 
ambulances, state has de facto adopted measures contrary to article 11(1).  
However, an effective and adequately functioning EMS system (i.e. a system 
that responds without undue time intervals) cannot be evaluated simply based on 
the statistics on how quickly ambulance reaches patient. In conjunction with article 
11(1), article 13(3) can also be invoked to challenge state’s actions, political 
decisions and guidelines on EMS. Whereas article 11(1) unquestionably refers to 
the obligation of state, article 13(3) grants the right to receive appropriate personal 
help required to prevent, remove or alleviate personal want directly. Thus, to be 
able to resuscitate patient according to the valid medical guidelines ambulance crew 
needs to be professionally trained and have access and knowledge to use 
functioning medical equipment such as a defibrillator properly. Furthermore, in 
conjunction with articles 11(1) and 13(3) of the Charter being most appropriate in 
protecting the right to EMS, the general principle of non-discrimination shall not be 
disregarded.  Codified in Part V article E of the revised Charter and thus forming a 
counterpart to article 14 of the ECHR,33 the non-discrimination provision safeguards 
the enjoyment of the rights covered by the Charter by prohibiting discrimination 
without objective and reasonable justification on any grounds including social 
origin, health, religion or sex.34 Therefore, in addition to the number and locations 
of the ambulances, the complaint on failure to provide an adequate EMS system 
can also emerge, for example, as a result of insufficient educational schemes, lack 
of properly functioning medical devices or the policy decisions applied in some 
discriminatory manner such as the guidelines preventing paramedics treating 
patients who live in social care facilities.  
1.3. CHALLENGES ON LODGING THE COMPLAINT ARE MAINLY CAUSED 
BY STATES 
The enforcement mechanism of the first Charter of 1961 was constructed 
solely upon the state reporting system excluding the opportunity for individuals to 
challenge states for non-compliance with the Charter. 35  Largely because of the 
rather insufficient protection offered by the original Charter, the CoE introduced a 
new way of enforcing the socio-economic rights through the CCP Protocol in 1995. 
                                         
33 Explanatory report to the Revised European Social Charter, supra note 12, 136-137 
34 According to the Part V article E discrimination is prohibited on any grounds such as race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction or social origin, health, association with 
a national minority, birth or other status. However, the term ‘such as’ indicates the list not to be 
exhaustive; Explanatory report to the revised Charter, supra note 12, 136. 
35 Oliver De Shutter, supra note 18: 463; The European Social Charter (1961), part IV. 
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Thus, the inherent aim of the new procedure was to increase the efficiency of the 
supervisory mechanism.36  
Although the adoption of the CCP has indisputably enhanced the protection of 
the rights covered by the Charter, the successful utilization of the procedure is open 
to some challenges. Firstly, the ratification of the protocol is required as a 
precondition for application of the procedure following the rules of general treaty 
law.37  In August 2018, only fifteen states had accepted the protocol,38 whereas 
number of the state parties to the Charter was thirty-four.39  Secondly, while the 
Charter provides states with a certain freedom to choose the rights which they 
consider binding, the collective complaint can merely be filed against an article or 
provision of the Charter which state has accepted.40 Thus, despite the noble aim of 
enhancing the protection through the Protocol, application of the CCP is inherently 
dependent on the willingness of state to provide such a supervisory mechanism 
over socio-economic rights. Willingness or lack thereof, on the other hand, can be 
seen to reflect state’s perception and understanding of the overall importance of 
social and economic rights.     
Considering that the state has ratified the Protocol and accepted being bound 
by articles 11(1) and 13(3) of the Charter, the Protocol imposes additional 
preconditions for the viability of the complaint. As the name of the procedure 
suggests, in order to be regarded as collective, a complaint cannot be lodged by an 
individual per se. Therefore, according to article 1 of the Protocol only complaints 
from pre-specified international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or from 
certain limited organizations representing employers or employees are accepted. 
However, article 2(1) of the Protocol allows state to recognize by declaration the 
right of any other representative national NGO within its jurisdiction to lodge the 
complaint, providing that NGO has a particular competence in the matter governed 
by the Charter. Sadly, Finland appears to be the only state acknowledging this 
competence.41  
                                         
36 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing 
for a System of Collective Complaints (Strasbourg, 1995), 2. 
37 European Social Charter (revised), Part IV, art D(1). 
38  Countries that have ratified the Protocol are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden; 
Council of Europe, “Chart of Signatures and ratifications of the convention no 158” (6 August 2018) // 
http://www.the CoE.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/158/signatures?p_auth=gV2pnvym. 
39 Council of Europe, “Chart of signatures and ratifications of the convention no 163” (6 August 2018) // 
http://www.the CoE.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/163/signatures?p_auth=1zaCooN0. 
40 CCP Protocol, art. 4. 
41 Council of Europe, “Reservations and Declarations relating to the 1995 Protocol Providing a System of 
Collective Complaints” (6 August 2018) // https://rm.the CoE.int/The 
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168048b059. 
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Furthermore, for the complaint to meet the requirement of collectiveness, 
individual situations cannot be addressed as such.42 However, the rule should not 
be interpreted too strictly as a complaint arising from individual situation may 
proceed successfully if situation can be generalized.43 The failure of an ambulance 
to reach one patient within a reasonable time thus can be regarded as collective in 
nature if the failure occurred because of state’s inability to provide a sufficient 
number of EMS units in close proximity to the population to respond the needs of 
individuals. Simultaneously, unsuccessful resuscitation that originates from 
insufficient training can have an impact on a number of patients. On the other 
hand, as the complaint shall establish state’s failure to ensure the satisfactory 
application of the provision of the Charter,44 unlike claims submitted to the ECtHR, 
the collective complaint is not dependent on the incidents occurring but can de 
facto be lodged based, for example, on merely political decisions to reduce the 
number of ambulances, deteriorate educational facilities or not to provide properly 
functioning medical equipment, if non-compliance with articles 11(1) and 13(3) is 
foreseeable.  
Based on admissibility, the CCP offers flexible ways of lodging a complaint on 
the right to EMS. Considering that the state has ratified the CCP Protocol and 
accepted the binding force of articles 11(1) and 13(3) of the Charter, general 
claims challenging the overall effectiveness of the prevailing EMS system should be 
proceed successfully when lodged by eligible organization. Claims on failure to help 
one patient can also succeed if the failure is regarded as having wider importance. 
However, the ineffectiveness of the procedure relies heavily on the states’ 
perception of the importance of social and economic rights.  
2. THE RIGHT TO EMS CAN BE INTERPRETED ALSO IN THE ECHR  
2.1. THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE ECHR TO NOT EXPLICITLY 
CONFER SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
The ECHR has been described as one of the greatest and most important 
achievements of the CoE providing a major contribution to human rights law at 
regional and global levels.45 In fact, considering that the ECHR was established as 
early as 1950, it is the first legally binding document implementing the common 
                                         
42 Explanatory report to the 1995 Protocol, supra note 36, 31.  
43  Robin R. Churchill and Urfan Khaliq, “The Collective Complaints System of the European Social 
Charter: an Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic and Social Rights?” European 
Journal of International Law 15 (2004): 432. 
44 CCP Protocol, art. 4. 
45  Malcom N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 347; Ralph 
Beddard, Human Rights and Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge Grotius Publications, 1993), 1. 
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standards of human rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
merely two years earlier.46 The significance of the ECHR is complemented further 
by its extensive geographical scope, as forty-seven European and former Soviet 
states altogether have ratified the Convention. 47  Furthermore, since the 1980s 
states wishing to join to the CoE have been required to accept and ratify the 
Convention.48 Similarly, acceptance of and adherence to the ECHR is acknowledged 
as an obligatory condition of European Union membership which, in itself, reflects 
the high recognition of the values and principles codified in the Convention. 49 
Moreover, in addition to the fact that the Convention and its fourteen protocols 
form an extensive list of civil and political rights, the significance of the ECHR is 
further enhanced by the exceptional enforcement mechanism as the provisions 
concerning the Court (ECtHR) had already been codified in the ECHR thereby 
making the jurisdiction of the ECtHR binding upon all the states ratifying the 
Convention. 
The obligation of the state to safeguard the civil and political rights under the 
ECHR is applicable to all human beings irrespective of the conditions such as the 
conduct of an individual, citizenship or legal basis of residence, thereby reflecting 
the universal, indivisible, indispensable and inalienable nature of human rights.50 
Furthermore, the state is not only required to refrain from interference with the 
rights and freedoms of individuals but also demanded to take appropriate steps to 
protect such rights and to prevent other individuals from violating them. 51 
Additionally, as time of emergency, article 15(1) allows state to make measures 
derogating from its obligations under the ECHR, article 15(2) specifies the rights 
that cannot be derogated in any circumstances. Therefore such rights, including 
article 2 protecting the right to life and article 3 concerning the prohibition of 
torture, are regarded as hard-core human rights of essential importance. 52 
                                         
46 Rick Lawson, “The European Convention on Human Rights”: 423; in: Catarina Krause and Martin 
Scheinin, eds., International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (Turku: Åbo Academy Institute for 
Human Rights, 2012). 
47 Council of Europe, “Chart of signatures and ratifications of the convention 005” (6 August 2018) // 
http://www.the CoE.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=IHX23mQ7. 
48 Alastair Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 13. 
49 Francis G. Jacobs, The Sovereignity of Law: the European Way (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 23; Vaughne Miller, “Is Adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights a 
Condition of European Union Membership?” Standard Note SN/IA/6577 (March 25, 2014): 7. 
50 Soering v. UK, European Court of Human Rights (1989, 11 EHRR 439). 
51 Association X v. UK (1978, 14 DR 31), 32. 
52  Loukis G. Loucaides, “Restrictions or limitations on the Rights Guaranteed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights”: 338; in: Martti Koskenniemi, et al., eds., Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law IV (Helsinki: Ius Gentium Association, 1993). 
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Moreover, derogations are designed to be temporary solutions to extraordinary 
situations, thus making permanent derogations incompatible with the Convention.53  
Although the ECHR consists of the rights and freedoms that are regarded 
essential as for political democracy and rule of law, the Convention offers states the 
possibility to make reservations in respect of any particular provision of the 
Convention.54  However, unlike the Charter explicitly providing the possibility to 
exclude certain provisions, the ECHR has adopted the perception whereby states 
should considered themselves bound by the Convention as a whole making the 
reservations exceptions. Furthermore, the fact that article 57(1) of the ECHR does 
not exclude any rights from reservations appears rather controversial in relation to 
the preamble and article 15(2) both recognizing and securing the inherent 
characters of human rights. Therefore, despite the wording of the article 57(1), the 
general treaty law prohibits any reservation which is incompatible with the object 
and the purpose of the treaty can be invoked to challenge the possible reservations 
made to articles 2 and 3 under the ECHR.55   
In essence, the fundamental value of the ECHR relies on its binding nature to 
oblige states to protect the most fundamental civil and political rights. However, 
despite the fact that health care is generally categorized as a socio-economic right, 
it does not appear infeasible to apply the ECHR and its protection mechanism to 
protect the right to EMS as well.  
2.2. APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO EMS CAN BE 
FOUND IN THE ECHR 
The wording of the ECHR does not provide direct references to health care or 
the EMS per se. However, the ECtHR has issued judgements involving the health-
related matters such as mental illness or the medical condition of the applicant.56 
Furthermore, bearing in the mind the inherent nature of EMS providing urgent 
treatment for injuries or sudden illnesses, applicable protection of the ECHR in 
relation to the right to EMS is based on articles 2 and 3 especially. Simultaneously, 
the importance of article 8 protecting the right to respect for private and family life 
shall not be overlooked.57 However, a comprehensive overview of relevant articles 
                                         
53  Fionnuala Ni Aolain, “Transitional Emergency Jurisprudence: Derogation and Transition”: 30; in: 
Antoine Buyse and Michael Hamilton, eds., Transitional Jurisprudence and the ECHR: Justice, Politics and 
Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011). 
54 The ECHR, art. 57(1). 
55 Vienna Convention on Law of the Treaties (1969), art. 19(1)(c). 
56 See, for example, Gard and Others v. United Kingdom (2017, application no. 39793/17); Keenan v. 
United Kingdom (2001, 33 EHR 38); D v. United Kingdom (1997, 24 EHRR 423). 
57 Article 14 prohibiting discrimination is simultaneously applicable to any rights covered by the ECHR. 
However, as this article is invoked to supplement the rights set out in other articles of the ECHR the 
extensive analysis of article 14 is excluded from this article; Furthermore, Protocol 12 of the ECHR 
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is needed in order to fully recognize the relationship of the ECHR and the right to 
EMS. 
It should also be noted that while many of the cases presented below have 
been litigated over decade(s) ago and have received wide discussions in academic 
literature, their applicability to EMS has not been analysed yet. Furthermore, these 
cases have introduced numerous legal interpretations that are still valid and can be 
applied to defend the right to EMS in the ECtHR. Therefore, even though newer 
case law is also presented, the older judgments and legal principles enshrining from 
them illustrate that grounds for protecting EMS have already existed for years. 
These older cases cannot thus be regarded as outdated in the present analysis. 
2.2.1. ARTICLE 2 AND THE RIGHT TO EMS ARE CLOSELY 
INTERCONNECTED 
Article 2 of the ECHR consists of two paragraphs. Whereas the first paragraph 
announces that everyone’s right to life shall be protected by the law, paragraph two 
lists three exceptions deriving from the necessary use of force. Largely based on 
the wording of article 2(2) in particular, the ECtHR has in fact issued numerous 
judgements concerning the disproportionate use of force, unlawful killings and 
ineffective investigations of deaths. 58  However, the ECtHR has also determined 
cases concerning inter alia abortion, right to die and the conditions of the detainees 
ultimately leading to death, not simply state’s obligation to safeguard the right to 
life against violent acts.59 
Despite the fact that the right to EMS as such has not yet been defended in 
the ECtHR,60 the general doctrines from the comprehensive case law concerning 
the interpretation of the right to life are applicable to EMS as well. For example, the 
Court stated in McCann that the state is under the positive obligation to take steps 
to prevent the avoidable loss of life,61 which in relation to EMS, means state’s 
obligation to provide and maintain an effective EMS system that is actually capable 
of responding to life-threatening medical conditions without undue delays and with 
professionally trained ambulance crew. The obligation to safeguard life by providing 
adequate medical assistance, however, can be justified, for example, by the ruling 
                                                                                                                       
introducing non-discrimination as an autonomous right has not received general acceptance as the 
number of states ratifying the Protocol in August 2018 was 20. 
58 Ioniță v. Romania (2017, application no. 81270/12); McCann and others v. United Kingdom (1995, 21 
EHRR 97); Ergi v. Turkey (2001, 32 EHRR 18); Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey (2000, ECHR 129). 
59 Vo v. France, ECtHR (2005, 40 EHRR 12); Tysiac v. Poland (2007, 45 EHRR 42); Pretty v. United 
Kingdom (2002, the ECHR 427); Mojsiejew v. Poland, ECtHR (2009, Application no 11818/02). 
60 In a case Fudrik v. Slovakia (2008, Application no. 42994/05) the applicant sought to challenge the 
Slovakian legal framework on Emergency Services because of his daughter’s death in mountaineering 
accident but the Court did not find the existed Slovakian legal framework insufficient in the context and 
ruled the case to be inadmissible. 
61 McCann v. UK, supra note 58, 151. 
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in LBC v. UK where exposure to nuclear tests had caused leukemia.62 Furthermore, 
in Osman v. UK the Court held that a real and immediate threat to life required 
reasonable measures from state.63  
Whereas McCann and LBC can be invoked to justify the obligation of state to 
provide a functioning EMS system, Osman provides grounds for individual claim. 
Originally referring to real and immediate threat to an identifiable person in relation 
to criminal actions, the ruling could nevertheless be applied to situations such as 
that in which ambulance crew knew that patient had a coronary heart disease but 
failed to take an electrocardiogram film (ECG) although patient complained of chest 
pain during EMS mission. 64  Moreover, the ECtHR judgements concerning state 
obligation to safeguard the right to life against violent actions of individual are, in 
relation to EMS, applicable to cases of  mentally ill person posing a threat to his 
own life or lives of other individuals, i.e., a threat to public safety. According to the 
ECtHR, such a person can be placed in a mental hospital against his will as a 
preventative measure.65 Although not every mentally ill person poses a threat to 
life or requires ambulance as the first medical unit, in the most severe cases the 
failure to provide EMS unit with properly trained medical staff to respond to 
situation can exacerbate the avoidable loss of life. 
Furthermore, in addition to somewhat traditional right to life cases concerning 
inter alia the use of force or medical treatments such as abortion, the ECtHR has 
applied article 2 to the environmental issues as well. For example, in Öneryildiz v. 
Turkey the Court ruled that Turkey was in violation of article 2 by failing to act to 
prevent the methane exploding in a waste dump near to a slum quarter despite the 
known risk.66 In Budayeva and others v. Russia the breach was found due to the 
state’s failure to take measures to prevent a known risk of mudslides although the 
ECtHR recognized the wide margin of appreciation of the state especially in cases of 
natural disasters when an impossible or disproportionate burden is imposed on the 
authorities.67 
Öneryildiz and Budayeva provide three significant notions in relation to EMS. 
Firstly, as both cases involved situations in which the authorities knew or ought to 
have known the identified risk to life but failed to adopt appropriate measures, the 
circumstances are comparable to measures where number of ambulances is 
reduced in highly-populated areas despite statistical risk analysis defending actual 
                                         
62 LBC v. United Kingdom (1998, 27 EHRR 212). 
63 Osman v. United Kingdom (1998, EHRR 245). 
64  Marco Roffi, et al., “2015 ECG Guidelines for the management of acute coronary syndromes in 
patients presenting without persistent ST-segment evaluation,” European Heart Journal 37 (2015): 274. 
65 Storck v. Germany (2005, application no 61603/00), 105; Winterwerp v. the Netherlands (1979, 2 
EHRR 387), 39. 
66 Öneryildiz v. Turkey (2005, 41 EHRR 20). 
67 Budayeva and others v. Russia (2008, application no 15339/02). 
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need for units. Secondly, unlike natural disasters, EMS cannot be regarded as force 
majeure imposing an unbearable burden on state, as the need for functioning 
health care system is widely recognized through known and common causes of ill-
health and diseases. Furthermore, practically every state bound by the ECHR is also 
obliged to take appropriate measures to ensure the enjoyment of the right to health 
and health care either under the European Social Charter or widely-ratified UN 
instrument protecting socio-economic rights.68 Finally, the fact that the ECtHR has 
expanded its scope on interpretation of article 2 to environmental issues in addition 
to the traditional cases offers greater possibility for claims concerning the right to 
EMS to succeed. However, the right to life is not the only right under the ECHR that 
could be applied to EMS but the potential of articles 3 and 8 should also be 
recognized.  
2.2.2. ARTICLE 3 CONFERS GREAT IMPORTANCE UPON THE RIGHT TO 
EMS 
The wording of article 3 is unambiguous, stating that no one shall be 
subjected to torture or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. Providing 
no exception, the absolute nature of article 3 is therefore regarded as representing 
the most fundamental values in democratic societies making no derogation 
permissible even in the event of public emergency threatening the existence of 
nation.69  
Degrading treatment as the mildest of the prohibited actions is defined by the 
ECtHR as arising in a victim’s feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of 
humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral 
resistance, or when it drives the victim to act against his will or conscience. 70 
Inhumane treatment amounts inter alia to premeditation, application for hours, 
causing actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering. 71  Finally, 
torture is found in the most severe cases where deliberately inhumane treatment 
causes very serious and cruel suffering.72  
In fact, article 3 has been applied to a limited number of the health related 
cases.73 For example, emphasizing the exceptional circumstances of the case in D 
v. UK, the ECtHR held that the deportation of the person suffering the terminal 
stage of the AIDS to a country with poor medical facilities amounted to a breach of 
                                         
68 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), supra note 6. 
69 Chahal v. United Kingdom (1997, 23 EHRR 413), 79-80. 
70 Tyrer v. United Kingdom (1978, 2 EHRR 1), 30. 
71 Jalloh v. Germany (2006, the ECHR 721), 68-83. 
72 Aksoy v. Turkey (1996, 23 EHRR 553), 63. 
73 For example, Keenan v. United Kingdom, supra note 56, and Herczegfavly v. Austria (1993, 15 EHRR 
437) in relation to treatment of mentally ill patients.  
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article 3 by subjecting the person to inhumane treatment.74 Similarly, imposing a 
chronically ill detainee to passive smoking constituted a violation of article 3 in 
Elefteriadis v. Romania.75 On the other hand, in Pretty v. UK, the Court did not 
accept the claim of the woman paralyzed by degenerative and terminal illness 
invoking the positive obligation of the state to protect her against the degrading 
treatment which would result if she could not commit assisted suicide.76  
In addition to cases directly concerned with medical issues, the general cases 
clarifying the interpretation of article 3 provide significant grounds for the right to 
EMS as well. Whereas long-term physical abuse and mental distress have been 
interpreted to amount to torture, a forcible change of haircut has been regarded as 
degrading because of humiliation and immediate visibility.77 Although the level of 
severity is determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the brutality of action 
required to amount to torture, it appears relatively challenging to imagine such 
situations occurring in relation to EMS. However, acknowledging that inhumane or 
degrading treatment does not need to cause long-term injuries, 78  a breach of 
article 3 may derive, for example, from situations in which intravenous infusion is 
misplaced and drug is delivered to muscle instead of blood vessel. Simultaneously, 
in some cases merely inappropriate and humiliating treatment of patient by 
paramedic on racial grounds may be regarded as degrading. Furthermore, 
disregarding the wishes of patient not to be treated with analgesic medication, for 
example, would constitute degrading treatment under article 3 as well as 
interference with personal autonomy secured by article 8. 
Similarly to all rights covered in the ECHR, the state has a positive obligation 
to secure the enjoyment of article 3, an obligation not expanded by the fact that ill-
treatment is carried out by private individuals.79 Since the obligation is especially 
emphasized in cases where authorities are aware or ought to be aware of the 
misconduct,80 the state is obliged to ensure that ambulance crew is aware of the 
guidelines of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and during the action have a 
proper understanding of circumstances affecting treatment, including patient’s age, 
health, life expectancy and duration of lifelessness prior to the medical intervention, 
to take an example. Despite the attempt to secure the right to life, extensively 
prolonged or misapplied resuscitation may be considered as futile, and may expose 
                                         
74 D v. United Kingdom, supra note 56; Klaus Kapuy, Danny Pieters, and Bernhard Zaglmayer, Social 
Security Cases in Europe: the European Court of Human Rights (Antwer – Oxford – Portland: 
Intersentia, 2007), xx. 
75 Elefteriadis v. Romania (2011, application no. 38427/05). 
76 Pretty v. United Kingdom, supra note 58. 
77 Selmouni v. France (2000, 29 EHRR 403); Yankov v. Bulgaria (2005, 40 EHRR 36), 112. 
78 Tomasi v. France (1993, 15 EHRR 1). 
79  Moldovan and others v. Romania (No 2) (2005, Application no 41138/98 and 643210/01), 98; 
Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom (1993, 19 EHRR 112); A v. United Kingdom (1998, 27 EHRR 611). 
80 Z and others v. United Kingdom (2002, 34 EHRR 3), 73. 
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surviving patient to a severe brain damage, leaving patient in a vegetative state, 
which in itself could be regarded as inhumane or degrading.  
Moreover, while alleged violations of article 3 at the ECtHR have largely 
derived from particular instances of misconduct, failure to provide prompt and 
professional medical treatment has also been interpreted by the Court to amount 
inhumane or degrading treatment.81 Thus, in relation to EMS situation in which 
child who is bleeding from a head injury resulting from a sudden fall on the asphalt 
is forced to wait ambulance may constitute inhumane treatment considering age of 
the patient, the state of his health and pain he is experiencing while awaiting help. 
Simultaneously, a highly immobilized elderly person suffering from sudden 
aggressive viral gastroenteritis could claim a violation of article 3 due to the failure 
to obtain prompt and professional treatment. However, despite the fact that 
inhumane or degrading treatment is essentially attached with subjective feelings of 
individual thereby becoming eligible for an individual claim, violation of article 3 
may nevertheless reflect the wider problem of the ineffectiveness of prevailing EMS 
system. Thus a claim essentially constructed upon individual situation may be 
expanded to include general claim as well.  
2.2.3. ARTICLE 8 SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED  
Article 8 – safeguarding the right to respect private and family life – appears 
to have an equivalent meaning especially in conjunction with article 2 in relations to 
the health related claims. According to the first paragraph of article, everyone has 
the right to respect his private and family life, home and correspondence. Similar to 
articles protecting the freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 9), of 
expression (art. 10) and of assembly (art. 11), the second paragraph of article 8 
allows the right to be interfered with public authority only in the predetermined 
situations listed in the article protecting inter alia interests of national security, 
public safety, economic well-being, health or morals. Additionally, the limitations 
must be necessary in a democratic society and done in accordance with the law.82  
The case law of the ECtHR illustrates the extensive scope of article 8 dealing 
with the questions from sexuality, parental issues to data protection, transgender 
issues and environmental concerns.83 In fact, the ECtHR stated in numerous cases 
                                         
81 Hurtado v. Switzerland (1994, the ECHR 25); Keenan v. United Kingdom, supra note 56. 
82 The ECHR, art. 8(2). 
83 X and Y v. Netherlands (1986, 8 EHRR 235); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (1982, 4 EHRR 149); 
Johnston v. Ireland (1987, 9 EHRR 203); Keegan v. Ireland, ECtHR (1994, 18 EHRR 342); M.N. and 
Others v. San Marino (2015, Application no. 28005/12); Khan v. United Kingdom (2001, 31 EHRR 45); 
Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002, 35 EHRR 18); Fadeyeva v. Russia (2005, The ECHR 376); 
Hämäläinen v. Finland (2014, Application no. 37359/09); Giacomelli v. Italy (2007, Application no. 
59909/00). 
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that private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition.84 Thus, 
anything to do with personal health, physical and psychological integrity, personal 
autonomy, philosophical, religious or moral beliefs or family and emotional life can 
be considered to fall under the concept of private life.85  
As article 8 is widely applied in conjunction with article 2, the distinctive 
element of article 8 in relation to the right to life derives from the fact that, unlike 
article 2, the right to private life de facto includes the notion of the personal 
autonomy and physical integrity.86 For example, in Glass v. UK the ECtHR found 
that the hospital interfered with the personal autonomy under article 8 by giving 
morphine to a disabled child against the mother’s wishes although other means to 
alleviate the pain were available.87 In X v. Finland the Court held that physical 
integrity does not cease due because of a diagnosed mental illness.88 In Tysiac v. 
Poland the Court held that article 8 included the patient’s right to be heard while 
considering her medical treatment. 89  Thus, personal autonomy appears as a 
valuable principle in relation to EMS as well.  
The correct application of personal autonomy requires broad medical 
understanding from ambulance crew because, as the Court has stated in numerous 
cases, individuals need to be provided with proper information on health risks.90 
Thus, the decision of patient to decline transportation to medical center or refusal 
to take pain medication should result from personal evaluation based on 
information on risks explained by ambulance crew. On the other hand, medical 
professionals should also know how to evaluate whether applying the right to 
personal autonomy, such as a patient refusing treatment and transportation despite 
a headache, would in fact endanger patient’s right to life, for example, because of 
an incipient cerebral hemorrhage.  
Furthermore, equivalent to articles 2 and 3, the state is also obliged to take 
appropriate measures to secure the rights of individuals also under article 8. 
However, the Court has discussed and acknowledged the balance between state’s 
economic interests and individuals’ right to respect private and family life for 
example in Hatton and others v. UK or Flamenbaum and Others v. France regarding 
the proximity of an airport, and in Lopez Ostra v. Spain concerning industrial 
                                         
84 Peck v. United Kingdom (2003, 36 EHRR 4), 1, 57; Niemietz v. Germany (1992, 16 EHRR 97), 29. 
85  Lisa Waddington, “Unravelling the Knot: Article 8, Private Life, Positive Duties and Disability: 
Rewriting Sentges v. Netherlands”: 333; in: Eva Brems, ed., Diversity and European Human Rights: 
Rewriting judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013); G. Cohen-Jonathan, “Respect for Private and Family Life”: 407; in: McDonald, et al., eds., The 
European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Dordrecht, 1993). 
86 Y.F v. Turkey (2003, the ECHR 391), 33. 
87 Glass v. United Kingdom (2004, 39 EHRR 15). 
88 X v. Finland (2012, Application no. 34806/04). 
89 Tysiac v. Poland, supra note 59. 
90 Brincat and Others v. Malta (2014, Applications nos. 60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11, 62312/11 and 
62338/11); Vilnes and Others v. Norway (2013, application no. 52806/09); Guerra and others v. Italy 
(1998, 26 EHRR 357). 
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pollution.91 In a sense, these judgments may be seen to allow state to some extent 
to justify centralization of ambulance service in densely populated areas where 
demand is greater than in the rural areas. However, even if the economic interests 
of the state are fairly balanced against private lives of individuals living where 
ambulances have been removed, the state is nevertheless under an obligation to 
ensure effective exercise of articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. Therefore, application of 
article 8 is closely linked to the right to life and the prohibition of torture, inhumane 
or degrading treatment also in the context of arranging emergency health care 
services. 
2.3. CHALLENGES TO LODGING A CLAIM ARISE FROM STRICT 
ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA 
The broad scope of human rights protected in the ECHR provides various ways 
of constructing a claim on the right to EMS for lodgment at the ECtHR. Contrary to 
the original system of the ECHR by which admission to the Court required 
acceptance from the European Commission of Human Rights, Protocol 11 coming in 
force in 1998 and merging the Commission into the Court granted direct access to 
the ECtHR for individuals.92 However, similar to the admissibility criteria on the CCP 
under the Charter, the applications to the ECtHR are also subject to particular 
conditions.  
For a start, a claim needs to concern the interpretation and application of the 
Convention or its Protocols, thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the ECtHR.93 As 
a general requirement for admission to the ECtHR is that the application also needs 
to identify the applicant, all domestic remedies have to be exhausted, the 
application must be lodged within the required time frame, and the application 
cannot have already been examined or submitted to another procedure.94  
As the fulfilment of such criteria seems reasonably easy to meet, successful 
admission consists of additional requirements as well. Although the right to submit 
individual application is automatic,95 article 34 of the ECHR requires that applicant 
is the victim of a violation by state of the rights set out in the Covenant or its 
protocols. However, as strict and literal interpretation of the demand would exclude 
those applications in which the victim is toddler or killed as a result of alleged 
                                         
91 Hatton and others v. United Kingdom (2003, 37 EHRR 28); Flamenbaum and Others v. France (2012, 
applications nos. 3675/04 and 23264/04); Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1994, 20 EHRR 277). 
92 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby (1994, CETS No. 155); Alastair Mowbray, supra 
note 48, 12-15. 
93 The ECHR, art 32. 
94 The ECHR, art. 35(1) and art. 35(2)(b). 
95 J.G. Merrills and A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe: a Study of European Convention on Human 
Rights (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 202. 
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misconduct under article 2, under certain circumstances the ECtHR has recognized 
the right of representatives such as family members to lodge the application 
against the state.96 While such exemptions are not in dispute in situations of a 
deceased person, it could nevertheless also be invoked when a person who is a 
victim of the violation is unable to submit the claim himself. Thus, the application 
submitted by the family members of a patient who suffered a brain damage due to 
misapplied resuscitation cannot be rejected solely on the principle of victimology 
under article 34 of the ECHR.  
Furthermore, in addition to the eligibility of single person, an application can 
also be submitted by NGO or group of individuals.97 Whereas a group of individuals 
is relatively easy to identify, the essential challenge focuses on the question of what 
constitutes an NGO. On some occasions, legal persons have been recognized as 
falling within this scope.98 Thus, a private ambulance company may, for example, 
successfully claim violation of the freedom of expression when company is 
prevented from publishing research results contradicting the validity of commonly 
applied guidelines provided to cardiac arrest. On the other hand, public organs 
exercising public functions cannot be regarded as NGOs.99 Therefore, it follows that 
organs such as hospital districts or municipalities responsible for providing EMS are 
ineligible to enforce their rights against state at the ECtHR.      
Moreover, the fact that article 34 of the ECHR requiring that applicant, 
whether individual, NGO or group of individuals, be a victim of a violation would 
indicate that the application must relate to the damage that has already occurred. 
Nevertheless, even in the 1980s the Court has accepted that under certain 
conditions an individual may claim to be a victim of a violation because of the mere 
existence of a law.100 Considering EMS as a specific sub-category of health care 
responding to urgent medical situations, in real life not every individual evidently 
needs to enjoy the right to EMS to ensure the right to life. However, the fact that 
an individual does not need to invoke the right to EMS does not preclude the state’s 
obligation to provide EMS system in such a manner that it de facto safeguards 
everyone’s right to life. Therefore, the mere existence of discriminatory legislation 
or EMS guidelines, for example, prohibiting public safety dispatcher from sending 
ambulance to social health care facilities could be challenged as violating article 2 of 
the ECHR together with article 14 or protocol 12 prohibiting discrimination. 
                                         
96 Gard and Others, supra note 56; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Malacu and Others v. 
Romania (2016, Application no. 55093/09). 
97 The ECHR, art. 34. 
98 Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KGv. Austria (2003, 36 EHRR 57); Vereinigung Democratisher Soldaten 
Osterreichs and Gubi v. Austria (1995, 20 EHRR 56). 
99 Danderyds Kommun v. Sweden (2001, application no 52559/99); Ayuntamiento De Mula v. Spain 
(2001, application no 55346/00). 
100 See, for example, Klass v. Germany (1979-1980, 2 EHRR 214); Norris v. Ireland (1988, 13 EHRR 
186); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, supra note 83. 
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However, despite the ECtHR accepting that under certain circumstances 
violations occur because of the mere existence of law, article 35(3)(b) of the ECHR 
nevertheless requires that applicant have suffered a significant disadvantage. This 
admissibility criterion introduced by Protocol 14 in 2004 was designed to maintain 
and improve efficiency and to ease the ECtHR workload allowing the Court to 
concentrate on more severe violations and disregard applications considered as de 
minimis. 101  It might therefore appear that the mere bruises caused by rough 
examination of a patient by a paramedic may not be admissible before the ECtHR 
despite treatment being regarded as degrading and violating article 3 of the ECHR. 
However, as the consideration of whether the applicant’s suffering amounts to a 
significant disadvantage is evaluated on a case-by-case basis,102 the ECtHR has 
also accepted applications where significant disadvantage has not been found but 
the case was regarded as being of general interest. 103  Thus, an application 
concerning the failure of ambulance to respond within medically reasonable time 
and therefore caused a loss of life may seem successful when application is 
expanded to involve general interests and have potential to endanger the 
enjoyment of the right to life in more broadly as well. Therefore, despite 
recognizing the novel reasoning behind the principle of ‘significant disadvantage’, it 
can nevertheless be perceived as to some extent hindering the legal certainty of 
admissibility to the Court as the exhaustive definition of what constitutes significant 
disadvantage is not, cannot and indeed should not be established. It follows that 
the lack of specific definition allows variety of cases yet to be submitted, and the 
success of application depends on the violation in question and on the validity of 
the arguments. 
In conclusion, the admissibility criteria established in articles 34 and 35 of the 
ECHR are relatively detailed but somewhat controversial. The most challenging 
aspects of lodging application relate to the questions of how the notion of a ‘victim’ 
is defined, what type of violation is claimed and whether applicant has suffered 
significant disadvantage caused by the violation. Individual claim alleging violation 
of rights resulting from incident which has already occurred, such as loss of life 
under article 2 or violation of personal autonomy covered by article 8 resulting from 
misconduct by paramedics, might be easily lodged, although it seems questionable 
whether such individual events are regarded as causing significant disadvantage to 
                                         
101 Protocol no 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Amending the Control System of the Convention (2004, CETS No. 194); European Court of Human 
Rights, Research Report: The New Admissibility Criterion under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention: The 
Case-law Principles two Years on (Council of Europe/the European Court of Human Rights, 2012), 4-5. 
102 Ibid., 8. 
103  Zivic v. Serbia, ECtHR (2011, application no 37204/08); Karelin v Russia (2016, Application no 
926/08); Hebat Aslan and Firas Aslan v Turkey (2014, application no 15048/09); see also Janneke H. 
Gerards and Lize R. Glas, “Access to justice in the European Convention on Human Rights system,” 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 35 (2017). 
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applicant. On the other hand, general claims challenging the overall effectiveness of 
EMS system could succeed as they have general interest and may affect to 
numerous individuals. However, to combine a general claim with an individual one 
alleging that the violation of the rights of one individual resulted from the 
ineffectiveness of EMS system in general would in fact provide the best grounds for 
successful application. 
3. PROTECTION PROVIDED BY THE CHARTER IS NOT INFERIOR TO 
THE ECTHR 
Despite the fact that the Charter and the ECHR have been designed to 
complement each other, the ECHR, protecting civil and political rights, has widely 
been perceived as prevailing over the protection of socio-economic rights thereby, 
for its part, invoking the differences among the two types of human right 
categories.104 Nevertheless, as a result of the evolution and enhancement of the 
protection mechanisms under both legal documents, the claim that the ECHR offers 
superior protection to the Charter does not seem indisputable. 
3.1. BOTH MECHANISMS SHARE SOME SIMILARITIES 
Considering the longer existence of the ECtHR in comparison to the CCP 
established in the late 1990s, consistent case law and comprehensive jurisprudence 
emerging over the decades have evidently strengthened the importance of the 
Court.105 However, the collective complaint procedure should not be regarded as 
uninfluenced by the significance of the ECtHR. In fact, decisions provided by both 
enforcement instances are constructed upon equivalent principles.  
Despite the differences between civil and political rights and socio-economic 
ones, the famous ECtHR doctrine of margin of appreciation allowing states to 
determine the limits of their own social norms, morals and security can be found 
inter alia also from ERRC v. Bulgaria in which the Committee recognized similar 
principle applied to state’s right to determine the steps to be taken to ensure 
compliance with the Charter.106 Both enforcement systems would therefore allow 
state to have broad consideration of how EMS system as such is organized, 
providing that arrangement does not violate the rights protected in the ECHR or the 
                                         
104 Krzysztof Drzewicki, “European System for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights”: 403-404; 
in: Catarina Krause and Martin Scheinin, eds., International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook 
(Turku: Academy University Institute for Human Rights, 2012); Oliver De Shutter, supra note 18: 463. 
105 Rhona K. M. Smith, International Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 106. 
106 European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) v. Bulgaria (2005, complaint no 31/2005), 35; margin of 
Appreciation has been referred to in numerous ECtHR judgments but one of the most famous one is 
Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976, 1 EHRR 737). 
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Charter. Simultaneously, as the Committee has regarded the Charter as a human 
rights instrument with an aim and purpose, the ECtHR has acknowledged that the 
ECHR is a living document being subjected to the changes.107 It thus follows that 
although no application claiming non-compliance or violation of the right to EMS 
has been lodged yet, such a claim is not excluded from the scope of the Charter or 
the ECHR as both documents have been designed to adopt a relatively flexible 
approach to the protection of human rights. Furthermore, while both enforcement 
mechanisms based their decisions on a case-by-case evaluation, discrimination 
without objective justification is not accepted by either of them.108 Therefore, one 
protection mechanism should not prevail simply because of claim would involve 
discriminatory aspects.     
Furthermore, as the Charter and the ECHR together have been drafted to 
enhance and safeguard the ideas and principles of the CoE in respect to human 
rights as well as fundamental freedoms and the rule of law in a democratic society, 
the enforcement mechanisms also reflect the inherent principle of a fair trial 
requiring impartiality and independence as well as allowing the parties to be heard 
in the process.109 Furthermore, transparency is enhanced because of final reports 
of the Committee and judgements of the Court are made public.110 While nowadays 
the fair trial principle has more or less been taken for granted in democratic 
societies, impartial, transparent and prompt enforcement procedures increase 
people’s trust towards the human rights protection. Similarly, transparent 
processes and public judgments contain the responses also from state party of the 
proceedings, and reflect state’s inherent perceptions and attitudes on human rights. 
The question is thus not only on the internal human rights situation and alleged 
violations of one state but the process can also have wider effect to state’s 
reputation in the international arena. It may follow that mere participation in the 
process may invoke state to improve its human rights situation in order to 
guarantee its own self-interests,111 such as maintenance of international relations 
with other states or pleasing public prior to elections.  
However, while the fundamental principles of the protection mechanisms in 
the Charter and the ECHR are equivalent and thus indicate that similar level of 
protection could be obtained in relation to the right to EMS, there is nevertheless 
                                         
107 ICJ v. Portugal (1999, complaint no 1/1998), 32; Selmouni v. France, supra note 77. 
108 European Federation of Employees in Public Service v. France (2000, complaint no 2/1999), 31-32; 
the ECtHR has emphasized the concept, especially in relation to the cases concerning the margin of 
appreciation, such as Handyside v. UK, supra note 106, or discrimination cases such as Thlimmenos v. 
Greece (2000, application no  34369/97); IAAE v. France (2003, complaint no 13/2002); Belgian 
Linguistic Case (No 2) (1968, 1 EHRR 252). 
109 The ECHR, art 21(3); European Social Charter (revised), Part IV, art. 25(4). 
110 European Social Charter (revised), art. 8(2); The ECHR, art. 44(3), 45. 
111 Carl Schmitt, the Concept of the Political [1929] (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 19-32. 
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divergences between the systems. Such differences can include the capability to 
hinder the effectiveness of the protection.   
3.2. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PROTECTIONS STILL REFLECT THE 
PREVAILING CATEGORIZATION 
In essence, the inequalities of the protection mechanisms, such as 
admissibility criteria and binding force of judgements, reflect the diverse natures of 
civil and political human rights in comparison to socio-economic ones. The first-
mentioned are characteristically designed to provide protection to each individual in 
their particular situations, whereas the latter generally affects to wider population, 
thereby requiring complaints to be submitted by the organizations.    
As described above, the right to EMS can be enforced equivalently under the 
Charter and the ECHR. However, the ECtHR admissibility criteria seem much 
stricter than the criteria on the CCP, as in the latter the submission of complaint is 
not dependent on exhaustion of domestic remedies nor contains specific time limits. 
This would make admission to the procedure significantly quicker than the ECtHR 
where access generally takes years because of the time-consuming processes in the 
national courts. Presumably the requirement for a specific time-limit and execution 
of domestic remedies seems dispensable as the purpose of the CCP is to challenge 
state’s non-compliance with particular provision of the Charter, non-compliance 
thus continuing and the provisions not being implemented properly in the domestic 
law or at all.112  Understandably, individual filing (or considering filing) claim in 
human rights enforcement body wishes prompt proceeding. In a wider perspective, 
alleged violations should in fact be investigated and decisions issued quickly in 
order to remedial measures to be initiated and further human rights violations 
prevented. 
Furthermore, unlike the ECtHR where manifestly ill-founded application is 
declared inadmissible,113 interestingly enough collective complaints are not rejected 
despite having no factual basis. Thus, claim that paramedics caused the death of 
patient by failing to recognize the symptoms of stroke while examining patient for 
stomach flu two months prior to the cerebrovascular accident occurring would not 
be accepted by the ECtHR towing to the lack of medical evidence on a probable 
causal relation. 114  However, constructing a claim to show the state’s non-
                                         
112 Robin R. Churchill and Urfan Khaliq, supra note 43: 433-434. 
113 The ECHR, art 35(3)(a). 
114 Common symptoms of a cerebrovascular accident such as hemiplegia, speech dysfunction, visual 
dysfunctions and dizziness appear suddenly and cannot be recognized weeks prior to the stroke; see, for 
example, S. E. Andrade, et al., “A systematic review of validated methods for identifying cerebrovascular 
accident or transient ischemic attack using administrative data,” Pharmathe Coepidemiology and Drug 
Safety 21 (2012): 100. 
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compliance with articles 11(1) and 13(3) of the Charter by not providing proper 
training for ambulance crew to recognize strokes could be accepted as collective 
complaint despite the ill-founded example. 
The binding force of final judgements imposes another substantial difference 
between the two enforcement mechanisms. One of the most remarkable aspects of 
the ECtHR being regarded almost as a constitutional tribunal arises because the 
Court’s judgement is final and state who is a party to case undertakes to abide it,115 
and refusal to comply may provoke new ECtHR case. 116  However, resolutions 
resulting from the CCP are non-binding recommendations addressed to state 
concerned,117 which essentially appears to weaken the protection of the Charter in 
comparison to the legally binding judgements of the ECtHR. On the other hand, 
despite the non-binding nature of resolutions, states cannot simply disregard the 
findings of the Committee but are in fact obliged to recognize results and adopt the 
measures necessary to comply with the Charter as well as to provide information on 
the measures adopted.118 Thus, similarly to the supervision on the execution of the 
ECtHR judgements, the compliance with resolutions of CCP is also monitored while 
providing state with some autonomy in choosing the means to fulfil those 
obligations. 
Furthermore, participation in process in the CCP as well as in the ECtHR under 
the fair trial principle requires that the state thoroughly evaluate its conduct and 
compliance with the human rights instrument in question. In the best case, 
proceeding concerning specific event such as the loss of life under article 2 of the 
ECHR due to the failure of ambulance to reach patient within a medically reasonable 
time would also result in changes in a wider perspective as state by itself analyses 
the overall effectiveness of EMS system in general. Simultaneously, evaluation of 
the non-compliance with the article 11(1) and 13(3) of the Charter due to some 
appointed failures in EMS, such as delayed response times or unprofessional 
ambulance crew, would also provoke state to assess the functionality of other 
health care sectors. The differentiating element, however, derives from the fact 
that whereas admission to the ECtHR requires applicant to be a victim of a 
violation, the CCP claiming unsatisfactory application of the Charter provisions can 
be invoked without anyone having to suffer an injury. Thus, the enforcement 
procedure of the Charter provides a better mechanism for the preventative 
protection of the rights. 
                                         
115 The ECHR, art 46(1). 
116 The ECHR, art. 46(4). 
117 CCP Protocol, art 9(1) 
118 Ibid, art. 10.  
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3.3. LODGING THE CLAIM SIMULTANEOUSLY IN BOTH ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISMS IS ALSO POSSIBLE 
Whereas the CCP offers prompt admission unconcerned with exhaustion of 
domestic remedies, the nature and scope of the Charter hinders protection as 
states are allowed to designate the provisions to be bound on. Simultaneously, 
being codified into the separate legal document application of the CCP is dependent 
on state’s willingness to adopt such an enforcement mechanism. Therefore, 
considering the comprehensive list of states ratified the ECHR and acknowledging 
the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, admission to the Court is available in practically every 
European and former Soviet state. On the other hand, the strict admissibility 
criteria impair access to the Court. 
Furthermore, even though the ECtHR was originally designed to provide 
protection for individuals against the violation of their rights, the increasingly 
enormous workload over the years has forced the Court to enhance its system.119 
Tightened admissibility criteria introduced by Protocol 14, including the notion of 
‘significant disadvantage’, have directed the Court to the point where admissible 
cases are nowadays more likely to involve a wider significance either for individual 
or public in general. While this trend increases the efficiency of the Court and 
provides broader protection to individuals, the enhancements of the ECtHR reduce 
the possibilities for individuals to apply to the Court. Therefore, despite the 
advantages and disadvantages of the protection mechanisms of both the ECtHR and 
the Charter, it remains impossible to unequivocally pronounce that one system 
would provide superior protection of the right to EMS. 
It should be noted that the CCP does not exclude a claim of submission to 
another international investigation procedure. While such applications are declared 
inadmissible to the ECtHR,120 thereby safeguarding the Court’s autonomy to decide 
cases without influence of another international body, the protection of the right to 
EMS could be sought initially from the Court and, after receiving judgement, claim 
can be submitted to the CCP. Moreover, article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR essentially 
declares inadmissible only those cases which have been submitted to another 
international investigation by same person(s) and both complaints contain identical 
facts without relevant new information. 121  Thus, while the application was held 
inadmissible in Martin and 22 others v. Spain or in Poa and others v. UK, because 
of the applications’ collective nature concerning inter alia working conditions, in 
                                         
119 Philip Leach, Helen Hardman, et al., Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations: An Analysis of 
‘Pilot Judgements’ of the European Court of Human Rights and their Impact at National Level (Antwerp – 
Oxford – Portland: Intersentia, 2012), 9. 
120 The ECHR, art 35(2)(b). 
121 William A. Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 774. 
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Folgero and others v. Norway admission to the ECtHR was permitted, although the 
claim concerning the same factual basis was also submitted to the UN Human 
Rights Committee but by different applicants.122 Therefore, the rule established in 
article 35(2)(b) is inapplicable inter alia when applicants are not same persons or 
application is lodged by NGO without authorization of the victim.123 
As complaints to the Committee are lodged by NGOs whereas admission to 
the ECtHR requires application from the victim of the violation it follows from the 
case law of the ECtHR and of article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR, that the protection of 
the right to EMS can de facto be sought from both ECtHR and the Committee 
simultaneously. Furthermore, whereas the Charter provides protection for the 
population generally, allowing claims concerning inter alia the state’s failure to 
provide sufficient number of ambulances, the ECHR would require the violation of 
article 2 even though the violation had occurred due to the lack of ambulances 
available to respond to individual situation. Since successfully admissible application 
to the ECtHR requires individual component, despite claims essentially challenging 
the overall ineffectiveness of EMS system, application and the collective complaint 
cannot be regarded as identical, which in fact makes the enforcement of the right 
to EMS applicable in both protection systems simultaneously. 
CONCLUSION 
Emergency medical service (EMS) is a special branch of the health care 
system designed to respond to situation in which urgent treatment is needed for 
injury or a sudden onset of illness. While the right to health care has traditionally 
been considered as socio-economic right inferior to the first generation human 
rights, because of its inherent nature of safeguarding the right to life, EMS balances 
between both human rights categories. 
The Council of Europe (CoE) is indisputably a forerunner in the global human 
rights regime in adopting the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
already in 1950 and the Social Charter in 1961. The conventional viewpoint 
separating civil and political rights from socio-economic ones and stressing the 
significance of the first category was upheld for decades by the ineffective 
enforcement mechanism under the Charter providing individuals practically no 
measures to enforce their social and economic rights. Fortunately, the importance 
of socio-economic rights was realized in 1990s and measures dedicated to 
strengthening the protection of those rights provided in the Charter were adopted. 
                                         
122 Martin and 22 others v. Spain (1992, 73 DR 120); Poa and Others v. the United Kingdom (2013, 
application no 59253/11); Folgero and others v. Norway (2006, application no 15427/02).  
123  Celniku v. Greece, (2007, application no 21449/04), 39-40; Smirnova and Smirnova v. Russia, 
(2002, application no 46133/99 and 48183/99); Folgero and others v. Norway, supra note 122.  
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While no case directly concerning the right to EMS has yet been decided by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), individual claims concerning failure 
to provide proper medical care under article 3 of the ECHR as well as violations of 
personal autonomy in relation to medical treatment according to article 8 have 
already been successfully challenged. Furthermore, the case law from the ECtHR 
nevertheless invokes state’s obligation to guarantee a functioning EMS system in 
more broadly perspective as well. The state having a positive obligation of securing 
the right to life by maintaining proper police forces to prevent the deprivation of life 
should not differ from the demand to guarantee prompt and professional medical 
response in life-threatening medical situations. 
Conversely, cases that are enforceable under both human rights instruments 
of the CoE, such as the right to EMS, challenge the traditional thinking about 
human rights categories. As a general claim alleging the unsatisfactory application 
of Charter article 11(1) protecting the right to health and article 13(3) ensuring the 
effective exercise of the right to medical assistance can be lodged easily under the 
collective complaint procedure, the violation of articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR 
provide good grounds for individual claim to be submitted to the ECtHR. 
The difference between the two enforcement mechanisms derives from the 
fact that whereas the protection of the right to EMS under the Charter can be 
invoked to challenge the ineffectiveness of prevailing EMS system without actual 
incident, successful application in the ECtHR requires individual involvement by 
which a particular right has already been violated and damage occurred. Although 
the ECtHR would declare inadmissible cases that have already been subjected to 
investigation of another international procedure, because of diverging natures of 
the collective complaint procedure and protection provided by ECtHR, the claim 
arguing the failure of EMS system to amount a violation can de facto be lodged 
simultaneously in both human rights enforcement systems, with a different 
emphasis and by different applicants. 
Furthermore, in comparison to the ECtHR, the less detailed admissibility 
criteria of the collective complaint procedure excluding, for example, the 
requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies as well as specific time frame 
certainly increases promptitude and attraction to enforcing the right to EMS under 
the Charter. However, the inherent weaknesses of protecting the right to EMS 
under the Charter are related to state’s privilege of designating binding articles of 
the Charter as well as the collective complaint procedure being codified in the 
additional protocol. 
Iin comparison to the CCP Protocol, the large number of ratifications in 
relation to the ECHR as well as the codification of the ECtHR in the Convention 
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unquestionably increase the importance of the document and, for its part, reflect 
the still prevailing understanding of civil and political rights as superior to socio-
economic rights. However, the measures taken to enhance protection under the 
Charter as well as the expansion of the interpretations of the ECHR articles by the 
ECtHR means that the conventional perception of the hierarchy of human rights 
categories is decreasing, making it (hopefully) easier for the right to EMS to be 
enforced in both of the enforcement mechanisms. 
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